Introduction
Credit market distress arises in its more virulent form only in certain monetary environments, and has its most extreme effects when it exacerbates a business cycle downturn. Policy questions about a central bank's role as lender of last resort or regulator must be seen in the context of monetary policy.
The relatively infrequent nature of major credit distress events makes an historical approach to these issues particularly useful. Using a combination of historical narrative and econometric techniques, we identify major periods of credit distress from 1875 to 2007, examine the extent to which credit distress arises as part of the transmission of monetary policy, and document the subsequent effect on output.
These issues involve relationships between policy rates (monetary aggregates), credit spreads, and GDP growth. Using turning points defined by the Harding-Pagan algorithm, we compare the timing, duration, amplitude and co-movement of cycles in money, credit and output. For the period since the 1920s, this is most easily done with a risk spread between corporate and Treasury bonds, the discount rate, and real GDP. This allows us to pick out and compare periods of tight credit that result from tight monetary policy and those that have a more exogenous cause. For the period from 1875 to 1920, credit spreads are measured by differences between yields on different rail road bonds, and the conditions in the money market are measured by commercial paper yields. We also examine the patterns for real stock prices since stock market crashes also can act as an exacerbating factor in credit turmoil.
Literature review
The effect of credit on the broader economy has been of concern to economists since the early days of the profession. Nineteenth century authors often spoke of "discredit," a term Kindleberger (2000) adopts for the later phase of a financial crisis. Mitchell (1913) was an early expositor of the credit channel as was Hansen (1921) , and J. Laurence Laughlin (1913) testified that "the organization of credit is more important than the question of bank notes." Disentangling the impact of credit supply from changes in demand as well as from the myriad channels of monetary policy remains a challenging empirical (and theoretical!) exercise even today. The importance of expectations in forward-looking financial marketsindeed for economic behavior in general-further compounds the problem.
Much work has focused on isolating the "credit channel" of monetary policy from other transmission mechanisms. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) review the ways monetary policy can affect the "external finance premium" and the cost and amount of credit obtained by firms. The balance sheet (or broad lending) channel affects firm (and individual) credit worthiness by changing the value of available collateral Gertler, 1989, Mishkin, 1978) The bank lending (or narrow lending) channel works by restricting banks' ability to borrow and subsequently lend to smaller firms (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988) .
Earlier, of course, Brunner and Meltzer (1972) emphasized the importance of distinguishing between money and bank credit.
Though agency problems, credit rationing, and other deviations from the Modigliani-Miller paradigm provide a basis for financial accelerator models that transmit the effects of monetary policy, such frictions also mean that credit markets can produce as well as transmit shocks. Rajan (1994) shows how banks can transmit business cycle shocks independently of monetary policy, as reputational concerns induce herding in credit availability. Gorton and He (2008) view credit tightening as an increase in monitoring by banks resulting from the need to enforce collusive behavior over time.
Empirically there have been several approaches to identifying credit effects.
One looks at particular historical episodes for evidence, and our historical narrative takes a closer look at this section of the literature. A second strand uses microeconomic data of particular industries, often looking at regulatory or other changes that shift bank portfolios (Haubrich and Wachtel, 1993, Beatty and Gron, 2001) or demonstrate that financial constraints affect firm investment (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988, Lamont, 1997) . A third strand examines the relationship between bank lending standards as a measure of the credit cycle. See eg. Asea and Blomberg (1998) , Lown and Morgan (2006) and Dell'Arricia and Marquez (2006) . And a fourth strand has worked to calibrate general equilibrium models with explicit financial frictions, looking to obtain tighter bounds of credit effects (Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997, Christiano, Motto and Rostogno 2008) , building on the earlier work of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) . This fourth strand builds upon the real business cycle work that emphasizes the importance of technology shocks as a driver of business cycles (Kydland and Prescott, 1982, Long and Plosser, 1983) . This literature also suggests that the historical record of money and credit shocks may be endogenous responses to more fundamental technology shocks (Cole and Ohanian, 1999) . We attempt to address these concerns by examining historical values of total factor productivity in our examination of cycles.
More recently, there has been renewed interest in observing correlations between macro variables across broad ranges of countries and time periods, as in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2008) . Our work is closer to these latter papers and the related work of Mishkin (1990) . Relative to Mishkin and Reinhart and Rogoff, we give greater attention to all business cycles, not just those associated with crises, giving a broader picture of the relations between money, credit and output. Relative to Claessens, Kose and Terrones and Reinhart and Rogoff, we look at one country, and are able to give greater detail on the institutional and historical factors at work in the economy.
For example, we can compare how contemporary accounts of credit conditions compare with empirical measures of credit tightness.
Section 2 presents an historical narrative, providing descriptive evidence on the incidence of policy tightening, banking and stock market crashes, and credit market turmoil across 27 U.S. business cycles. This narrative is designed to complement the empirical evidence in the rest of the paper where we use empirical methods to discern significant patterns in the data. We focus on the relationship between monetary policy, credit cycles, asset busts and real GDP. Section 3 discusses our methodology. We use the Harding and Pagan ( 2002) algorithm to identify cycles in money credit, stock prices and real GDP and then examine the concordance of these cycles.
Section 4 presents the empirical results, first comparing the duration, timing, and amplitude of cycles in money, credit, and output. Several sets of regressions then compare the depth of recessions to the cyclical movements in other variables. Section 5 concludes. Table 1 presents some salient qualitative features of the 29 U.S. business cycle recessions from 1875 to the present. We show evidence on the incidence of banking crises, stock market crashes, real estate busts, tight monetary policy, credit crunches.
Historical Narrative
We also provide brief comments on the underlying events. Figure 1 shows related data on real GDP, the price level, money supply (M2), bank lending, short-term interest rates, the quality spread, the Standard and Poor's stock price index, and index of real house prices.
2.1.Classical Gold Standard Period 1875-1914
From 1875-1914 1 the U.S. was an open economy on the gold standard and had significant capital inflows from Europe, especially the U.K.. There was no central bank but the Treasury on occasion performed central banking functions. The country had frequent business recessions and also frequent banking panics which greatly worsened the contractions. Banking panics were endemic in a banking system characterized by unit banking (with prohibitions against branching or interstate banking) and the absence of an effective lender of last resort. Foreign interest rate shocks as the Bank of England periodically raised its discount rate led to sudden stops in capital inflows, gold outflows, declines in the money supply, bank lending and declines in real output and prices (Bordo, 2006) . These events were associated with stock market crashes and banking panics.
The stock market was closely linked to the national banking system through the inverted pyramid of credit whereby national bank reserves in the country and reserve city national banks were concentrated in the New York banks. These reserves were held as call loans and were invested in the New York Stock exchange.
Consequently shocks to the stock market would spread to the banking system and vice versa (Bordo, Rappoport and Schwartz 1992) .
Contemporaries such as Sprague (1910) discussed the tightening of bank credit during these events. Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) present evidence of equilibrium credit rationing reflecting asymmetric information in the context of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model. 2
1 From 1875 to January 1, 1879 the U.S. was still on the floating Greenback Standard. However the Resumption Act of 1875 anchored expectations on the announced return to gold parity and the dollar pound exchange rate was very close to parity (Bordo, Erceg and Levin, 2007) . 2 Bordo, Rappoport and Schwartz ( 992) provide evidence doubting the presence of credit rationing in the National Banking era. They argue that it is difficult to distinguish credit shocks from shocks to the money supply. They explain most of the variation in national bank lending by the movement of stock prices held as collateral.
Of the ten business cycles for this period covered in Table 1, three had serious banking panics, with mild or incipient panics in another four. Deep recessions were associated with the banking panics. Seven downturns were associated with stock market crashes. There is no evidence of national real estate busts in this period although there were some famous regional busts, eg. California in the 1890s. In three of the recessions associated with panics, Bank of England tightening leading to a sudden stop of capital inflows was likely the source of the shock. In addition monetary tightening contingent on the fear that legislation associated with the Free Silver movement (Bland Allison Act of 1878 and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1893) likely led to the panic of 1893 and the currency (and minor banking) crisis of 1896 (Friedman and Schwartz,1963, Gorton, 1987) . According to Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) citing Sprague and others, credit crunches occurred in the major recessions.
2.2.Important Episodes

1873.
A serious international crisis with origins in a real estate bust in Vienna and Berlin was in the U.S. associated with corporate malfeasance in the dominant railroad sector (Benmelech and Bordo 2008) , a stock market crash and a banking panic with widespread banking failures. The panic ended with the suspension of of convertibility of bank liabilities into currency. The evidence of fraud in railroads precipitated a sudden stop in capital inflows from England. The resultant recession lasted until 1879. Mishkin (1990) provides evidence that a quality spread between Moody's Baa corporate bond rate and the long-term Treasury bond rate spiked after the banking panic and stock market crash. This is cited as evidence for the presence of declining net worth and asymmetric information, which in turn increased agency costs and reduced bank lending.
1893.
A serious banking and stock market crash in the summer of 1893 was triggered by the passage of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act, which led to fears the U.S. would be forced off the gold standard and to capital flight. In the crisis hundreds of banks [New] general business was …being done almost on a cash basis" (page 141), and Mishkin (1990) shows the quality spread peaks with the crisis. "The contraction of lending by the banking system as a result of its trouble reduced its role in solving adverse selection and agency problems and clearly made these problems worse in the financial markets" (page 19).
1907.
This serious recession was also accompanied by a banking panic and stock market crash. It may have been triggered by Bank of England tightening in 1906 in reaction to a gold outflow to the U.S. to cover insurance claims from the San Francisco earthquake (Odell and Weidenmeir, 2004) . In the U.S. the collapse of a corner of the copper market in October led to the failure of 8 banks, followed by the failure of the Knickerbocker Trust Company. This led to a run on the other trust companies and then a general panic. The issue of clearing house loan certificates, the transfer of funds from the Treasury to key New York banks and a rescue by a syndicate organized by J.P. Morgan alleviated the pressure, but the panic only ended with the suspension of convertibility. The panic was associated with hundreds of bank failures, a significant drop in money supply and a deep recession. As in other panic episodes, Calomiris and Hubbard cite contemporary evidence for a credit crunch. Persons (1920) discusses "a halt in further credit expansion" (page 147); Sprague (1910) : "It would seem, then, past business distress from lack of credit facilities was due at least to three influences: the restriction of cash payments by the banks increased the requirements of borrowers; the supply of loans was reduced by a moderate amount of contraction; and the shifting of loans involved considerable uncertainty and inconveniences" (page 303). Mishkin (1990) , as in the previous crisis shows a spike in the quality spread. According to him "the decline in the valuation of firms [in the stock market crash] raises adverse selection and agency problems for borrowing firms because it has in effect lowered their net worth. … The resulting increases in asymmetric information problems even before the October banking panic, should raise the spread between interest rates for high and low quality borrowers….The process of severe asymmetric problems even before the banking panic suggests that they were … potentially important factors in creating a severe business cycle contraction." (pp [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] .
1914.
The outbreak of World War I led to a massive capital outflow from U.S. financial markets to the belligerents. This massive sudden stop threatened the New York stock market, the banking system and U.S. gold reserves. Treasury Secretary
McAdoo invoked the Aldrich Vreeland Act to issue emergency currency to allay the banking panic, closed the NYSE and pooled U.S. gold reserves. The crisis was largely averted. There is no narrative evidence of a credit crunch.
The Interwar years: 1918-1945
The Federal Reserve was established in 1914 in part to solve the absence of a lender of last resort in the crises of the pre-1914 National Banking era. In its first 25 years there were three very severe business cycle downturns: 1920-21, 1929-33 and 1937-38 . All three were associated with very tight money. The 1929-33 recession had four banking panics producing the Great Contraction. The stock market crashed in 1920, 1929, 1930-32 and 1937 . According to White (2008) there was a real estate boom and bust in the 1920s and another in 1929-33. There is considerable evidence for collapse of bank lending (a credit crunch) in 1930 -33 and 1937 -38. According to Bernanke (1983 both the numerous bank failures that occurred and the collapse in net worth brought about by bankruptcies, falling asset prices and deflation, increased the cost of credit intermediation and reduced real output over and above the efforts of a decline in money supply posited by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) .
1920-21
The Fed tightened dramatically raising its discount rate in late 1919 to roll back the inflation that had built up during World War I and to restore effective adherence to the gold standard. This followed a severe but brief recession (industrial production fell 23%, wholesale prices fell 37% and unemployment increased from 4% to 12%) possibly because Fed actions were not anticipated (Bordo, Erceg and Levin, 2007) .
No banking crises occurred but there was a stock market crash, according to Mishkin and White (2002) . Also there is no narrative evidence for a credit crunch; the transmission of tight money occurred through a rise in real interest rates (Meltzer 2005 p.118).
1929-33
The Fed tightened beginning in early 1928 to stem the stock market boom which began in 1926. This tightening led to a recession in August 1929 and a stock market crash in October. The New York Fed initially followed expansionary policy to prevent a money market panic in October. It then stopped easing by the end of the year. Despite demands from New York, the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, following the real bills doctrine, was concerned about rekindling stock market speculation. A series of banking panics beginning in October 1930 ensued. The Fed did little to offset them, hence allowing the recession to become a depression.
According to Friedman and Schwartz(1963) , the banking panics reduced the money stock by a third and led to similar declines in real output and prices. The process was aggravated by debt and asset price deflation. According to Bernanke (1983) the bank failures and the collapse of net worth (Mishkin, 1978) raised the cost of credit intermediation seen in an increase in quality spreads. In addition, Calomiris and Mason (2003) and Calomiris and Wilson (2004) identify the shocks to bank lending (credit crunch) using, respectively, a panel of bank data by states and by New York City national banks.
1937-38
Recovery from the Great Contraction began with Roosevelt's Banking Holiday in early March 1933 and Treasury gold purchases (Romer, 1992) . It was slowed somewhat by the supply shocks of the NIRA (Cole and Ohanian, 2004) . A second severe recession in 1937-38 was produced by a major Fed policy error. It doubled reserve requirements in 1936 to sop up banks' excess reserves. This led to another collapse in money supply and a return to severe recession. Both Bernanke (1983) and Calomiris and Wilson (2004) see evidence for a decline in the supply of bank loans (a crunch) in response to deflation and declining net worth.
2.4
The Post-War Period: 1945 9
The Fed emerged from World War II still pegging Treasury bond prices. This policy led to high inflation which ended with tightening in October 1947 In the postwar period there were no banking panics and no serious stock market crashes. However, according to Wojinlower (1980 Wojinlower ( , 1982 Wojinlower ( , 1992 , credit crunches occurred when the Fed tightened, raising short term interest rates. As rates increased above the Regulation Q ceiling on time deposits (and later on CDs) this led to disintermediation of funds from the banking system and a decline in bank lending. Such disintermediation crunches were said to have occurred in 1953, 1957 and 1960.
The term "credit crunch" was coined in 1966. The Fed tightened in December 1965 at the beginning of the Great Inflation by raising the discount rate by 50 basis points to 4 ½ %. Disintermediation, as rates rose above the Regulation Q ceiling, was prevented by the Fed raising the ceiling rate to 5 ½%. Continued concern by the FOMC over inflationary pressure coming from higher rates led the Fed's bank regulating agencies to issue a statement in March urging lending restraint by the banks (Owens and Schreft, 1993, page 8.) Further statements urging non price credit rationing came from the House Banking and Currency Committee. This was echoed in a report by the American Banking Association. Then in July 1966 in the face of rising prime rates, the FOMC allowed Regulation Q to bind and banks experienced an outflow of funds. On September 1, the Fed sent a letter to all member banks urging them to slow the growth of their business loan portfolios (Owens and Schreft, 1993, page 15 .) The credit crunch led to a slowdown in bank lending and economic growth and on September 21 the Congress passed a law (which the Fed endorsed) urging it to " reduce interest rates as much as possible given prevailing economic conditions (Owens and Schreft 1993 page 16) . The crunch ended.
A similar sequence of events occurred in 1969. In early 1969, the Fed began tightening to stem inflationary pressure. Disintermediation occurred as market rates exceeded the Regulation Q ceilings . To discourage banks from raising their rates (which was deemed to be inflationary) the Fed and the Administration urged the banks in the spring to restrict their lending. Jawboning accelerated as the summer began. "Bowing to political pressure the major banks refrained from raising their prime rates further in the latter half of 1969 despite strong loan demand and rising loan rates . [The banks] instead relied more heavily on non price credit allocation methods" (Owens and Schreft, 1993, page 22) . Loan demand slowed by the end of 1969 as the economy slipped into recession, ending the credit crunch.
In 1973, the Fed again tightened to fight inflation. To insure against a credit crunch the Fed in May suspended Regulation Q ceilings on large CDs and raised ceilings on other deposit categories. At the same time it raised marginal reserve requirements: apparently it had shifted to a policy based on the price mechanism rather than credit availability. 3 (Owens and Schreft 1993 page 26) . Yet on May 22, Chairman Burns wrote a letter to bankers asking them to allocate credit through non price rationing instead of raising rates further (ibid). The Fed continued to tighten through 1974 by repeated hikes in the discount rate but ceased pressuring the banks with non price allocation techniques (ibid page 28). Beyond: 1980 Beyond: -2007 Inflation continued unabated through the 1970s. Debate swirls over the causes of the Great Inflation, 1965 -1982 . Some observers attribute it to the accommodation of expansionary fiscal policy, others to the Phillips Curve tradeoff and an unwillingness driven by political pressure to raise unemployment at the expense of inflation, and others to measurement errors in estimating potential output (Bordo and Orphanides, 2009) real rate of about 10 percent (Bordo, Erceg and Levin, 2007) 
Disinflation and
. Newly elected President
Reagan's support of Volcker's policy was significant in giving the Federal Reserve the mandate it needed to keep interest rates elevated for a prolonged period, and provided some shield from growing opposition in Congress (Feldstein, 1993) . This second and more durable round of tightening succeeded in reducing the inflation rate from about 10 percent in early 1981 to about 4 percent in 1983, but at the cost of a very sharp and very prolonged recession. In this episode there is no narrative evidence of a credit crunch.
The recession of 1990-91 was preceded by Fed tightening beginning in December 1988 (Romer and Romer, 1994) . It coincided with the first Gulf War. There was no banking crisis but there was a stock market crash in August 1990. There also was not a real estate bust, although real house prices declined 13% 1989-1993. According to Bernanke and Lown (1991) there was a credit crunch which they define as "a significant leftward shift in the supply of bank loans holding constant the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers". According to them a collapse in New England real estate reduced their equity capital and forced banks to scale back their lending. This reduced aggregate demand via the lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988 ) and contributed to the recession. Owens and Schreft (1993) , who define a credit crunch as "non price credit rationing," also posit that there was a credit crunch in the commercial real estate market, a "sector specific credit crunch that prevented commercial real estate developers and business borrowers using real estate as collateral from getting credit at any price" (page 50). and subsequently to a massive credit crunch. The collapse in credit reflected a severe drop in asset prices which eroded net worth and collateral, greatly increasing agency costs and quality spreads. In addition the weakening of major banks' balance sheets has impaired their lending. This has been greatly aggravated by a more than 50% drop in stock prices. Despite extensive central bank liquidity injections and the creation of a number of facilities at the Fed to rejuvenate the credit markets, the crunch still prevails. The credit crunch has produced a serious recession in the U.S. which has spread to the rest of the world.
Empirical Methodology
With an aim of examining cycles in money, credit and output since 1875, data availability and consistency become key issues. For business cycles, we use the NBER chronology (at a quarterly frequency). For Real Gross National Product (note it is GNP, not GDP) we use the numbers from Balke and Gordon (1986) Two cycles may be strongly non-synchonized and still influence each other; for example, an overlapping contraction might influence the depth of the recession.
Looking at the cycle overlaps provides more information about the empirical linkages between money, credit, and the business cycle over the years from 1875 to 2007. We explore how money, credit, and asset prices behave in recessions and look at how recessions differ according to the whether or not they are associated with credit crunches, tight money, and asset price drops. In this we are broadly following the methods of Reinhardt and Rogoff (2008) and Claessens, Kose, and Terrones (2008) . By also incorporating total factor productivity, our regressions attempt to separate out the effects of technology shocks (Long and Plosser, 1983, Cole and Ohanian, 1999 ) from financial turbulence in business cycles.
We present two sets of regressions.
The first set regresses the amplitude of the percentage peak-to-trough change in Real GNP against the changes in credit spreads, measures of money, and the stock index between the same NBER turning points.
The second set of regressions looks at how monetary, credit, and asset cycles affect the business cycle. For example, do recessions that start during a credit crunch look different than those that do not? Each NBER contraction is associated with the money, credit, or asset cycle phase that it starts in. The amplitude of the contraction is then regressed against the amplitude of the other cycle phases. For example, a recession that starts in a period of tightening credit and tightening monetary policy is associated with the amplitudes of those two "contraction" phases.
Empirical Results
Cycles can be described both by their individual characteristics and by their relation to each other. In our sample, from 1875:I to 2007:III, we have 27 (NBER) recessions, counted as complete peak to trough episodes. Tables 2 and 3 Credit shows a longer cycle. For the earlier sample, our measure of credit is the spread between different rail road bonds. These show a mean peak-totrough duration of 8.25 quarters, and a trough-to-peak duration of nearly 10 quarters, as well as showing noticeably longer maximum cycles. Also note the greater symmetry between expansions and contractions in the credit spread series. For consistency, the P-T of rates and spreads should be compared to the T-P of RGNP. For the later sample, using the spread between Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield less the long-term treasury composite, "contractions,"
Cycle characteristics
or periods of generally falling spreads, last an average of 11.1 quarters, longer than the NBER contractions, but the periods of "expansion" or rising spreads, lasts only 8.4 quarters, significantly shorter than the 17.7 of NBER expansions.
What about monetary policy? For the earlier period, we use two measures. The first is Balke and Gordon's measure of M2, taken as the yearover-year log difference. Mean peak-to-trough duration is 7.5 quarters, measuring 9.9 quarters for the trough-to-peak expansions. This indicates a cycle length similar to the NBER cycle and a bit shorter than the credit cycle. We also use the commercial paper rate as a measure of monetary tightness. This seems to exhibit a shorter and less variable cycle, with expansions and contractions of 6.75 and 5.5 quarters. For the later period, we continue with the Balke and Gordon M2 series, splicing in the Board of Governors M2 when it becomes available.
Like the NBER cycle, it is rather asymmetric, and perhaps not surprisingly, with contractions nearly twice as long as expansions. The discount rate, our other measure of policy, exhibits even more asymmetry, with mean peak-to-trough duration of nine quarters and mean trough-to-peak duration of over twenty.
(again note that a "contraction" in the money supply probably corresponds to an "expansion" in the discount rate.). Overall it is noticeably longer than the business cycle.
In the later period, recessions tend to occur in an environment of monetary tightening and tighter credit. Of the 17 NBER business cycle peaks in the subsample, 4 occurred in the same quarter as the peak in the monetary policy (discount rate) cycle, another 9 occurred during the tightening phase of policy, and 2 occurred in the quarter immediately after a peak in the discount rate cycle.
Fourteen of the 17 occurred in periods of credit tightening.
In the earlier period, the pattern repeats. Recessions tended to occur in time of monetary tightening, with all eleven NBER recessions occurring in a contractionary phase of M2 growth, and ten of the eleven occurring in an environment of rising commercial paper rates. These were also generally periods of tightening credit, though the pattern is not quite so obvious: in seven of the eleven cases rail road spreads were increasing.
Tables 6 reports the concordances and tests of synchronicity for the 20 th century. Recall that an actual concordance above expected concordance indicates series that move procyclically. Most interesting for our purposes is concordance with the NBER cycle, though we find it gratifying that the discount rate moves countercyclically with M2. For the 19th century, we find evidence for the importance of credit in that the Baa spread moves countercylically to the business cycle: increasing risk spreads are associated with recessions. The evidence for money is mixed, with the discount rate showing procyclical concordance, but we cannot reject independence for the log difference of M2. 
Regressions
The questions of whether larger changes in money, credit or asset prices are somehow associated with different amplitudes of contractions can be addressed in several ways. Following Claessens, Kose and Terrones, Tables 8   and 9 report regressions of recession amplitude against changes in the risk spread, money measures, and stock prices over the same dates as the NBER peak-to-trough phase. Such a regression of course does not determine causality, but to attempt to partially control for other factors, we also include the change in total factor productivity over the cycle. An alternative approach is to sort on the size of movements in risk spreads, money and stock prices, looking to see if larger movements in these variables leads to larger recessions. Since World War I, four contractions had particularly large increase in the Baa spread, four had particularly large drops in M2 (in fact only four saw actual drops) and four had particularly large drops in stock prices. Table 12 compares the mean recession amplitude for these extreme events with recession amplitudes without those events. If you will, it picks out the credit crunches and the stock crashes from the mere corrections. It makes a similar comparison between the three largest events in each category for the pre-WWI cycles. In every case, the contractions associated with a large crunch or crash are noticeably larger than those without, though this difference is statistically significant only for the pre-WWI years.
Conclusions
The evidence, though not conclusive, indicates both that more severe financial events are associated with more severe recessions, and that a confluence of such events also indicates increased severity.
The empirical results complement the cross country evidence of Claessens
Kose and Terrones, and Reinhart and Rogoff. Causality is of course always hard to determine, but the narrative evidence strongly suggests, and the empirical work is at least consistent with, the claim that credit turmoil worsens recessions.
The timing of cycles is likewise consistent with the work of Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek (2008) and others on the ability of corporate bond spreads to predict recession in more recent periods.
The results are consistent with work, such as Barro and Ursua (2009) , who find a high association between stock market crashes and large contractions, and
Claessens Kose, and Terrones, who find an interaction between stock market crashes and tight money and credit.
Somewhat paradoxically, the cycles in the quantity of money appear not to be synchronized with business cycles, but when the cycles do coincide, monetary tightening has a significant effect, and seems implicated in major recessions.
Money market measures, such as the discount rate, show greater synchronicity, but not more significant correlations. The historical evidence of banking panics associated with credit turmoil makes a case for the central bank acting as a lender of last resort.
The current episode combines elements of a credit crunch, asset price bust and banking crisis. It is consistent with the patterns we find using 140 years of US data. How does the current crisis measure up? Between August, 2007, and April, 2009 , the difference between the yield on Baa bonds and long-term
Treasuries has moved up 342 basis points, a larger increase than seen in the 1929 contraction, and approaching the combined increase of 436 bp over both the Depression contractions. The percentage drop in S and P index of 42% is second only to the 78% of the Great Contraction. Money supply, however, is a different matter, with an increase of 13% in the current period, the largest increase of M2 seen in any contraction. This should not be particularly surprising, however. As
Friedman and Schwartz point out, prior to deposit insurance banking panics would cause a collapse in the money multiplier, driving M2 down. Zarnowitz (1992) shows that business cycles downturns with panics are much more severe than others. Today because of deposit insurance, financial turmoil does not lead to panics and collapses in the money multiplier, and credit turmoil is less likely to feed into the money supply. The credit disturbance thus becomes relatively more important, given that disturbances on the asset side of the balance sheet no longer have as strong an influence on the money supply. Bernanke(1983) , Calomiris and Mason(2003) , Calomiris and Wilson(2004) . 6 Bernanke(1983), Calomiris and Wilson(2004) . 7 Romer and Romer(1989) pick October 1947 as the start of Fed tightening. 8 states that bank lending was impaired by the collapse in Treasury bond prices. 9 Romer and Romer(1989) date tightening as beginning September 1955. 10 Wojnilower(1980 10 Wojnilower( , 1982 10 Wojnilower( , 1992 , Eckstein and Sinai(1985) 1893,1895,1899,1902,1907,1910, and 1913 1920, 1923, 1926, 1929, 1937, 1945, 1948, 1953, 1957, 1960, 1969, 1973, 1980, 1981, 1990, 2001 
